The Constitutionality of Deploying Indonesian National Armed Forces Without House of Representatives Approval: A Perspective on Checks and Balances and Presidential Powers
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.38035/gijlss.v4i4.981Keywords:
Constitutionality, Deployment of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, House of Representatives Approval, Checks and Balances, Constitutional DemocracyAbstract
The Constitutionality of Deploying Indonesian National Armed Forces Without House of Representatives Approval: A Perspective on Checks and Balances and Presidential Powers. The deployment of military forces abroad for peacekeeping missions is frequently categorized as non-war operations by the executive, thereby bypassing parliamentary approval. This practice triggers legal debates concerning the boundaries of presidential discretion and potential breaches of the principle of limited power. This study aims to analyze the constitutional basis of presidential authority and evaluate the urgency of involving the House of Representatives in deploying armed forces to maintain institutional checks and balances. The method employed is normative juridical legal research utilizing statutory, conceptual, comparative, and case approaches. The results indicate that although the president holds supreme authority over the armed forces, this power is not absolute and must remain subject to democratic control. Administrative classifications of non-war operations should not serve as an excuse to evade parliamentary oversight, given that deploying armed forces abroad carries significant political, diplomatic, and security consequences. In conclusion, such deployments require the approval of the House of Representatives to uphold the principle of checks and balances. The government is advised to promptly establish explicit regulations ensuring legal certainty for military deployment procedures.
References
Ackerman, Bruce. “The Emergency Constitution.” Yale Law Journal 113, no. 5 (2004).
Ackerman, Bruce. Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
Anwar, A., Salmah, H. K., & Fatkhurohman, F. (2024). Does the Indonesian National Army develop democracy and human rights? a comparative perspective. Legality: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum, 32(2), 311-329.
Ayuni, Q., Arinanto, S., Arsil, F., & Indrati, M. F. (2022). Concept and implementation on the state of emergency in Indonesia: Outlook to strengthen checks and balances during crisis. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 9(1), 11-36.
Barak, Aharon. Judicial Discretion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
Barak, Aharon. Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court of Germany]. Out-of-Area Deployment Decision, Judgment of 12 July 1994.
Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
Chesterman, Simon. One Nation Under Surveillance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Dicey, A. V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London: Macmillan, 1959.
Dinstein, Yoram. War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Dyzenhaus, David. The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Ely, John Hart. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Feaver, Peter D. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Friedrich, Carl J. Constitutional Government and Democracy. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1950.
Glennon, Michael J. Constitutional Diplomacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Gray, Christine. International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany].
Hisyam, H., Hidayati, R., & Parmono, B. (2026). Executive–Legislative Relations in Appointing the Indonesian National Police Chief. Academia Open, 11(1).
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
Klabbers, Jan. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Kommers, Donald P., and Russell A. Miller. The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Mietzner, M. (2018). The Indonesian armed forces, coalitional presidentialism, and democratization: From praetorian guard to imagined balance of power. In Routledge handbook of contemporary Indonesia (pp. 140-150). Routledge.
Mietzner, M. (2022). Defending the Constitution, But Which One? The Indonesian Military, Constitutional Change, and Political Contestation. Constitutional democracy in Indonesia, 49.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. The Spirit of Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Ng, J., & Kurniawan, Y. (2024). The parliament and cooperative oversight of the Indonesian armed forces: Why civil–military relations in Indonesia is stable but still in transition. Armed Forces & Society, 50(3), 683-709.
Oren, Ido. Our Enemies and US: America’s Rivalries and the Making of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.
Republik Indonesia. Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945.
Republik Indonesia. Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia.
Rizzal, M. S., Ichlas, R. I., & Rustan, A. Analyzing the Presidential Power Constraints and the DPR Power Enhancement in the Indonesian 1945 Constitution: A Critical Approach.
Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Sulistafando, R. M., Yulianingrum, A. V., & Hasmiati, R. A. (2025). THE DESIGN OF TERM LIMITATIONS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA'S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MEMBERS: CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, AND THE CHECKS AND BALANCES MECHANISM. Awang Long Law Review, 7(2), 562-570.
Tomkins, Adam. Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Tushnet, Mark. The Constitution of the United States of America: A Contextual Analysis. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015.
United Nations. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. New York: United Nations, 2008.
United States Congress. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Fernando Silalahi, Aarce Tehupeiory
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright :
Authors who publish their manuscripts in this journal agree to the following conditions:
- Copyright in each article belongs to the author.
- The author acknowledges that the Greenation International Journal of Law and Social Sciences (GIJLSS) has the right to be the first to publish under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (Attribution 4.0 International CC BY 4.0).
- Authors can submit articles separately, arrange the non-exclusive distribution of manuscripts that have been published in this journal to other versions (for example, sent to the author's institutional repository, publication in a book, etc.), by acknowledging that the manuscript has been published for the first time at GIJLSS.
